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Over the last decades, the role of private and public sector concerning infrastructure 
projects was not disputed. Public authorities were generally in charge of financing and 
building new infrastructure. However, this assertion has recently changed providing 
more and more room to the private sector as public finance is in jeopardy. Rising 
pressure to reduce the public sector debt on the one hand and at the same time expand 
and improve public facilities on the other, has led governments and public authorities 
to look into private sector financing.  
This paper deals with issues raised by this public-private partnership in irrigation 
water projects. Although several approaches have been employed to handle this 
matter a discrete optimization analysis can significantly contribute to this problem. 
The main aim of this paper is to contribute to the definition of the most efficient 
investment programme in irrigation water infrastructure. More specifically, it explores 
the optimal ranking of project implementation when these projects are partially self-
financed by their own revenues. Results clearly demonstrate that the optimal ranking 
is not necessarily the ranking of decreasing socioeconomic internal rate of return.  
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1. Introduction 
For most of the last century, the roles of private and public actors in the infrastructure 
sector were clear. For instance, public authorities were generally in charge of 
financing and building new infrastructures (Grimsey and Lewis, 2005). Nevertheless, 
an inflexion was observed during the 1990s with a significant development of public-
private partnership (PPP). This is paradoxical since the most profitable lines were 
already service and the subsequent projects show a financial Internal Rate of Return 
(IRR) below the self-financing level. The paradox of the appearance (or reappearance) 
of the PPP in these circumstances has already been explained by Bonnafous (2002) 
who deals with the formalization of the need of subsidies.  
This paper deals with the new issues raised by the PPP system or, more generally, by 
any system in which the new infrastructure is partially financed by its users. Is there, 
in this case, a new economic rationality of public authorities? Particularly, is there an 
optimal way to rank projects?  
Before answering to these questions, we have to recall the logic of investment for 
both the private operator and the public sector in order to explore the financial logic 
of a PPP. From the classical point of view of microeconomics, it is assumed that a 
private operator implements a project if the expected IRR covers (Bodie and Merton, 
2000): (a) the market interest rate, (b) plus a risk premium which takes account of the 
uncertainties that necessarily affect assessments of, for example, costs and future 
traffic and revenue (the risk premium may also include an additional amount to cover 
uncertainties about the stability of the country in question, and (c) plus a profit 
margin. 
Thus, with a market interest rate of 4%, a risk premium of 4% and a profit margin of 
4% too, the minimum targeted IRR will be 12%. If the IRR of the project is any lower 
than this the operator will require a subsidy in order to reach 12%.  
The public authority is likewise using the IRR of the project, namely the discount rate 
which cancels out its Net Present Value (NPV). Nevertheless, the valuation of this 
NPV takes into account not only the future accounting of the operation but also those   3 
of concurrent operators and, more generally earnings and losses of all the concerned 
agents, including external effects such as the users surplus, consequences on safety or 
environmental effects. For this socioeconomic assessment, we will use the notation 
IRRse for the internal rate of return.  
In the tradition of public evaluation, a project is considered to be implemented when 
its IRRse is higher than a standard level. This border-line can be interpreted as a 
collective profitability condition: for any project having a lower IRRse than this 
standard level it is assumed that the destroyed wealth would be higher than the created 
wealth. That means that the NPVse of the project, evaluated with the standard level of 
interest rate, would be negative  
In the case of infrastructures exclusively financed by public subsidies (excluding any 
user contribution), if we consider not only one project but a program of scheduled 
projects, the objective function is the NPVse provided by the program. Thus, the 
question of the optimal ranking is solved by the decreasing order of the IRRse's and 
the rhythm of their implementation depends on the available budget. In the case of a 
PPP, and more generally when the projects are partially financed by the users, the 
objective function of the public authority still being the total NPVse of the program, it 
is not obvious that the decreasing order of the IRRse's provides the optimal ranking.  
In this case, this is typically the case of water infrastructures, the socioeconomic 
efficiency of each unit of subsidy result not only of the IRRse of each project but also 
of its need of subsidy, which is itself depending of its financial IRR. Thus, we have to 
use the relationship between the need for subsidies and the level of the IRR 
(Bonnafous, 1999).  
 
2. A fundamental relationship 
In order to formalize this relationship we shall consider a standard project for which 
an investment C will be made for a duration d, which is the number of years over 
which it has been assumed that expenditure will be evenly spread. The net profit made   4 
by the operation of the project once it has come into service is denoted by a, and it has 
been assumed that this will increase by an annual amount b.  
This corresponds to the stylized, but nevertheless quite familiar, account of costs and 
benefits. If it is assumed that the project comes into service at the date t=0, annual 
expenditure between the dates −d and 0 will be given by c=C/d. The profit made once 
the project comes into service is assumed to take the form (a+bt).  
The Internal Rate of Return (IRR) of the project, namely the discount rate which 
cancels out its Net Present Value (NPV), is therefore a function of the four parameters 
c, d, a and b. We must compare this IRR to the Rate of Return that an operator can 
reasonably expect.  
In what follows we shall use the following notation: α is the discount rate used to 
calculate the Net Present Value (NPV), α0 is the discount rate which cancels out the 
NPV of the project, which is therefore its IRR, δ is the amount by which the subsidy 
increases the IRR, τ is the rate of subsidy, i.e. the percentage of c which is financed by 
subsidies. 
For a discount rate α, and the present value of cost and benefits from date −d to date 










atat dtebtadtceNPV   (1) 
In order to simplify the calculations that follow, we shall assume that the present 
value calculation has been extended to infinity, which will have little effect on the 
results because of the small influence of the distant future (and the known 









































NcPV  (2) 
or alternatively: 












  (3) 







da   (4) 
A rate of subsidy τ lowers the annual cost of construction c to c(1−τ) and raises the 
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  (5) 
What is of prime importance to us in this function is clearly the relationship between t 
and δ. However, Eq. (5) also shows that this relationship obviously depends on the 
values of the parameters  c,  d,  a,  b and, of course,  α0, which characterize the 
economics of the project and which are moreover linked together by Eq. (4) which 
established the IRR of the project α0. If we wish to represent Eq. (5) we, therefore, 
need to keep some of these five parameters constant and vary just those whose role 
we wish to demonstrate. This is the well-known nomogram technique (Bonnafous and 
Jensen, 2005).  
 
3. Optimal order for a set of PPP projects 
To confirm this point, we will take a set of eleven water infrastructure projects for 
which homogeneous economical data can be obtained. Subsidizing rates have been 
calculated from Eqs. (4) and (5), taking 8% as the target IRR. We assume that there 
exists a budget constraint the first year (F, in MEuros), this constraint increasing by   6 
2.5% yearly. To make clear the role of the budget constraint, we have changed its 
value between 1 and 1,000 MEuros. For a given order of the projects, the value of F 
determines the rhythm of completion of projects, since each project needs to draw on 
this budget an amount τ. c of public subsidies each year.  
We first examine the interest of using the IRRse as a ranking criterion. For this, we 
calculate the NPVse returned by three different programs obtained by ranking the 
projects by alphabetical or inverse alphabetical order (simulating a random 
combination of the projects) or by decreasing IRRse. Fig. 1 shows that the IRRse is 





















Figure 1. Comparison of the NPVse returned by ‘random’ (alphabetical or inverse 
alphabetical) ranking of projects or by ranking with IRRse. 
 
However, our previous discussion suggests that the IRRse is probably not the best 
ranking criterion, mainly if budget constraints are important. Therefore, we can 
calculate the NPVse outputs obtained by ranking the projects with two other criteria: 
the financial IRR and the  output, defined as  O(i)=NPVse(i)/sub(i), where sub(i) 
represents the amount of public subsidies required by this project to obtain the 
targeted IRR (8%, as assumed above). In Fig. 2, we compare the total NPVse returned 
by the projects for different rankings, as a function of the mean subsidy required by 
all the projects ( <F>=305). More precisely, we plot the % of gain obtained by   7 
choosing the specified ranking criterion compared to the total NPVse returned by 
using the IRRse as the ranking criterion. Note that the curve labelled ‘Optimum’ 
(triangles) will be discussed below. The results presented in Fig. 2 confirm our 
intuition: the pure financial IRR is a better ranking criterion than the IRRse, and this 
is the truer the tighter the budget constraint. When this constraint is lower than some 
value (close to one third of the average subsidy needed for a project), the NPVse 
output of the program obtained with the IRRse ranking is frankly disastrous when 



















Figure 2. Comparison of the total NPVse returned by the 11 water infrastructure 
projects for different rankings (we plot the % increase of the program NVPse 
compared to that obtained by the IRRse ranking). 
 
Fig. 2 also shows that our ‘output’ criterion is even better than the IRR, for all the 
values of the public budget constraint. The point now is: can we find a better 
criterion? Can we be sure to have found the best possible ranking? The problem is 
that, since a program is a discrete combination of all the single projects, we cannot 
use the standard analytical optimization techniques such as Lagrangian multipliers or 
functional derivatives to find rigorously the best criterion. Therefore, we are left with 
exploring the different combinations of projects to find the one that yields the highest 
NPVse. However, the number of possible orders (11!) forbids an exhaustive   8 
examination of all the possibilities. Fortunately, several tools to explore efficiently the 
‘landscape’ of different combinations have been developed by several disciplines.  
 
4. Conclusion 
Let us summarize here our two main results, which may seem paradoxical but are a 
direct consequence of the present financial constraints: (a) When financial constraints 
are tight, the social return of a program of investments is higher when projects are 
ranked according to their pure financial characteristics (such as financial IRR), instead 
of their pure socioeconomic characteristics, and (b) we have also confirmed the 
hybrid optimum ranking criterion (Bonnafous and Jensen, 2005): the ‘output’, defined 
as the ratio of the socioeconomic NPV to the amount of subsidy it needs. In the case 
of infrastructure financed exclusively by public subsidies, the public objective 
function has traditionally been the NPVse provided by the program of scheduled 
projects, the question of their optimal ranking being solved by the decreasing order of 
their IRRse's and the rhythm of their implementation depending on the available 
budget. We have shown that in the case of a PPP, and more generally when the 
projects are partially financed by the users, the objective function of the public 
authority still being the total NPVse of the program, the decreasing order of the 
IRRse's does not provide the optimal ranking: the pure financial IRR is a better 
ranking criterion, and this is the truer the tighter the budget constraint. The ratio of the 
socioeconomic NPV to the amount of subsidy required is a still better criterion - in 
fact, the best. We can conclude, therefore, that both the tyranny of financial 
profitability and the error of ranking by the IRRse become issues as soon as the user 
becomes involved in the financing of water infrastructure.  
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